THE DETERMINED DRIVE TO WAR
By al001
This is not intended to reveal anything other than the intent by President Bush to go to war with Iraq long before the invasion began and how and by whom he was influenced then purposely mislead the American public up until the last moment. Much of this is the consequence of the PNAC which is short for the Project for the new America. The pages of this report have been compared to Hitler's Mein Kampf for it's outlining of an aggressive military plan for the U.S. world domination in the coming century.
It was created by a neoconservative think tank funded by energy and arms manufactures and headed by Dick Cheney until he became Vice President. The unexpected result of having won the cold war and now having no other military threat to face this group of ideologist created a blueprint for the future. To capitalize on a large military surplus of goods and forces, create newer weapons at an exaggerated price and force the corporate privatization throughout the known world.
Their goals were stated as:
1. Increase an already enormous military budget at the expense of domestic programs.
2. Toppling regimes resistant to our corporate interest.
3. Forcing democracy at the barrel of a gun in regions that have no history of the Democratic process.
4. Replacing the United Nations role of preserving and extending international order.
Since Bush's assignment to the position of the office of President we have seen these four objectives started. But what was needed for this to happen besides a corrupt election in Florida and a biased majority in the Supreme Court? They needed a war. According to their own creation, Rebuilding America's Defenses they stated that their goal could not be achieved in the “absent of some catastrophic event- like a new Pearl Harbor.” Was September 11, 2001 that Pearl Harbor? This is not to say the neoconservatives were involved but they could not help but take advantage of it to advance their agenda.
The signers of the original PNAC Statement of Principles are as follows. Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukeyama, I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle, Dan Quayle, Peter W Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S.Rosen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigel and Paul Wolfowitz.
George W Bush’s political career having been primarily funded by these same energy and defense contractors and being appointed by the Supreme Court after the questionable election in Florida immediately appointed many the signers of the PNAC document to the top levels of the White House and Pentagon. With this done our guard against terrorist attacks immediately went down. Richard Clarke the best anti-terrorist expert in the world was demoted to other projects and even Dick Cheney firmly said Clarke was “keep out of the loop.”
Paul O' Neil, former Secretary of the Treasury stated that the Bush Administration did not consider al Qaeda a physical threat. The Administration neglected and flatly denied the existence of a presidential briefing titled Bin Laden determined to attach inside the United States, until it became public. Condoleezza Rice lied to the 9/11 commission investigating this significant report until firmly pushed on the subject. Then it was discovered she had knowledge of the official report and was eventually pressed to read the title which she knew by heart. But as it turned out this was not the only time she lied to the commission.
It has now been revealed that the US Federal Aviation Authority received 52 intelligence reports from April to September, 2001. Five of which mentioned hijacking and two others told of suicide operations. Rice never mentioned this to the commission so there are 52 more lies or at the least omissions of the truth. This was kept secret by the Bush administration and then released much later in a heavily edited version. It was also noted that these 52 reports the FAA received were possibly only about half of the intelligence reports they received.
Rice said in her testimony that they could not have imagined that al Qaeda would use aircraft as missiles but if Clarke had not been demoted to a non effective position and they had listen to him instead of a political appointee she and the administration would have known. There was a prior failed effort to do just that with a private plane against Langley.
But what of the other lies we were told prior to the invasion. We know of one truthful statement made by Anthony H. Cordesman, senior analyst at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies: "Regardless of whether we say so publicly, we will go to war, because Saddam sits at the center of a region with more than 60 percent of all the world's oil reserves."
But every reason given by Bush, Cheney and the other spokespersons of the administration were not true. For example we were told that Iraqi oil would pay for the war but as of 10:58 AM central on January 30, 2007 the financial cost to us was well over three hundred and sixty four billion dollars and rising at a rate of somewhere around eighty-thousand dollars a minute. There were no weapons of mass destruction, no connections to al Qaeda and no ceremony of roses when we arrived. We now see only civil war, more terrorist and total chaos with no successful end in sight.
We know of the plane load of Saudis who were officially enabled to leave the country after 9/11 when every other flight was grounded. We were told they were questioned but no one admitted talking to them. We know that Bush, upon hearing the news of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center, questioned it as a probable private plane hitting it by mistake then casually went into the school to read to the children. Then he continued to sit and read for eight more minutes after being told of the second attack on the trade centers.
But were we ever told by the Government that George H.W. Bush was in a conference with bin Ladens brother at the time of the brutal attack or that George W. Bush's brother Marvin was on the board of Securacom, a company jointly owned by a Dubai company that provided security for the World Trade Centers and Dulles International Airport and that he lived at the Watergate, his bills paid for by Dubai interest. It should be noted that he quit Securacom in 2000 but was on the board of HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc. which insured parts of the World Trade center. He made a relative fortune by bailout legislation pushed through by his brother George W. Bush.
But for a moment let’s look at the Intelligence warnings that were ignored. These are offered by The Center for American Progress.
Former weapons inspector David Kay now says Iraq probably did not have WMD before the war, a major blow to the Bush Administration which used the WMD argument as the rationale for war. Unfortunately, Kay and the Administration are now attempting to shift the blame for misleading America onto the intelligence community. Yet a review of the facts shows the intelligence community repeatedly warned the Bush Administration about the weakness of its case, but was circumvented, overruled, and ignored. The following is a year-by-year timeline of those warnings.
FEBRUARY 23 & 24, 2001 – COLIN POWELL SAYS IRAQ IS CONTAINED: “I think we ought to declare [the containment policy] a success. We have kept him contained, kept him in his box.” He added Saddam “is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors” and that “he threatens not the United States.” [Source: State Department, 2/23/01 and 2/24/01]
Intel Agencies 2001: WH Admits Iraq Contained; Creates Agency to Circumvent
In 2001 and before, intelligence agencies noted that Saddam Hussein was effectively contained after the Gulf War. In fact, former weapons inspector David Kay now admits that the previous policy of containment – including the 1998 bombing of Iraq – destroyed any remaining infrastructure of potential WMD programs.
OCTOBER 8, 1997 – IAEA SAYS IRAQ FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: “As reported in detail in the progress report dated 8 October 1997…and based on all credible information available to date, the IAEA's verification activities in Iraq, have resulted in the evolution of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. These verification activities have revealed no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme objective of producing nuclear weapons or that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material or had clandestinely acquired such material. Furthermore, there are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.” [Source: IAEA Report, 10/8/98]
SEPTEMBER 16, 2001 – CHENEY ACKNOWLEDGES IRAQ IS CONTAINED: Vice President Dick Cheney said that “Saddam Hussein is bottled up” – a confirmation of the intelligence he had received. [Source: Meet the Press, 9/16/2001]
SEPTEMBER 2001 – WHITE HOUSE CREATES OFFICE TO CIRCUMVENT INTEL AGENCIES: The Pentagon creates the Office of Special Plans “in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true-that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States…The rising influence of the Office of Special Plans was accompanied by a decline in the influence of the C.I.A. and the D.I.A. bringing about a crucial change of direction in the American intelligence community.” The office, hand-picked by the Administration, specifically "cherry-picked intelligence that supported its pre-existing position and ignoring all the rest” while officials deliberately "bypassed the government's customary procedures for vetting intelligence." [Sources: New Yorker, 5/12/03; Atlantic Monthly, 1/04; New Yorker,]
2002: Intel Agencies Repeatedly Warn White House of Its Weak WMD Case Throughout 2002, the CIA, DIA, Department of Energy and United Nations all warned the Bush Administration that its selective use of intelligence was painting a weak WMD case. Those warnings were repeatedly ignored.
JANUARY, 2002 – TENET DOES NOT MENTION IRAQ IN NUCLEAR THREAT REPORT: “In CIA Director George Tenet's January 2002 review of global weapons-technology proliferation, he did not even mention a nuclear threat from Iraq, though he did warn of one from North Korea.” [Source: The New Republic, 6/30/03]
FEBRUARY 6, 2002 – CIA SAYS IRAQ HAS NOT PROVIDED WMD TO TERRORISTS: “The Central Intelligence Agency has no evidence that Iraq has engaged in terrorist operations against the United States in nearly a decade, and the agency is also convinced that President Saddam Hussein has not provided chemical or biological weapons to Al Qaeda or related terrorist groups, according to several American intelligence officials.” [Source: NY Times, 2/6/02]
APRIL 15, 2002 – WOLFOWITZ ANGERED AT CIA FOR NOT UNDERMINING U.N. REPORT: After receiving a CIA report that concluded that Hans Blix had conducted inspections of Iraq's declared nuclear power plants "fully within the parameters he could operate” when Blix was head of the international agency responsible for these inspections prior to the Gulf War, a report indicated that “Wolfowitz ‘hit the ceiling’ because the CIA failed to provide sufficient ammunition to undermine Blix and, by association, the new U.N. weapons inspection program.” [Source: Washington Post, 4/15/02]
SUMMER, 2002 – CIA WARNINGS TO WHITE HOUSE EXPOSED: “In the late summer of 2002, Sen. Graham had requested from Tenet an analysis of the Iraqi threat. According to knowledgeable sources, he received a 25-page classified response reflecting the balanced view that had prevailed earlier among the intelligence agencies--noting, for example, that evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program or a link to Al Qaeda was inconclusive. Early that September, the committee also received the DIA's classified analysis, which reflected the same cautious assessments. But committee members became worried when, midway through the month, they received a new CIA analysis of the threat that highlighted the Bush administration's claims and consigned skepticism to footnotes.” [Source: The New Republic, 6/30/03]
SEPTEMBER, 2002 – DIA TELLS WHITE HOUSE NO EVIDENCE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: “An unclassified excerpt of a 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency study on Iraq's chemical warfare program in which it stated that there is ‘no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has - or will - establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.’” The report also said, “A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents, precursors, munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) actions.” [Source: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 6/13/03; DIA report, 2002]
SEPTEMBER 20, 2002 – DEPT. OF ENERGY TELLS WHITE HOUSE OF NUKE DOUBTS: “Doubts about the quality of some of the evidence that the United States is using to make its case that Iraq is trying to build a nuclear bomb emerged Thursday. While National Security Adviser Condi Rice stated on 9/8 that imported aluminum tubes ‘are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs’ a growing number of experts say that the administration has not presented convincing evidence that the tubes were intended for use in uranium enrichment rather than for artillery rocket tubes or other uses. Former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright said he found significant disagreement among scientists within the Department of Energy and other agencies about the certainty of the evidence.” [Source: UPI, 9/20/02]
OCTOBER 2002 – CIA DIRECTLY WARNS WHITE HOUSE: “The CIA sent two memos to the White House in October voicing strong doubts about a claim President Bush made three months later in the State of the Union address that Iraq was trying to buy nuclear materials in Africa.” [Source: Washington Post, 7/23/03]
OCTOBER 2002 — STATE DEPT. WARNS WHITE HOUSE ON NUKE CHARGES: The State Department’s Intelligence and Research Department dissented from the conclusion in the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. “The activities we have detected do not … add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquiring nuclear weapons.” INR accepted the judgment by Energy Department technical experts that aluminum tubes Iraq was seeking to acquire, which was the central basis for the conclusion that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, were ill-suited to build centrifuges for enriching uranium. [Source, Declassified Iraq NIE released 7/2003]
OCTOBER 2002 – AIR FORCE WARNS WHITE HOUSE: “The government organization most knowledgeable about the United States' UAV program -- the Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center -- had sharply disputed the notion that Iraq's UAVs were being designed as attack weapons” – a WMD claim President Bush used in his October 7 speech on Iraqi WMD, just three days before the congressional vote authorizing the president to use force. [Source: Washington Post, 9/26/03]
2003:WH Pressures Intel Agencies to Conform; Ignores More Warnings Instead of listening to the repeated warnings from the intelligence community, intelligence officials say the White House instead pressured them to conform their reports to fit a pre-determined policy. Meanwhile, more evidence from international institutions poured in that the White House’s claims were not well-grounded.
LATE 2002-EARLY 2003 – CHENEY PRESSURES CIA TO CHANGE INTELLIGENCE: “Vice President Dick Cheney's repeated trips to CIA headquarters in the run-up to the war for unusual, face-to-face sessions with intelligence analysts poring over Iraqi data. The pressure on the intelligence community to document the administration's claims that the Iraqi regime had ties to al-Qaida and was pursuing a nuclear weapons capacity was ‘unremitting,’ said former CIA counterterrorism chief Vince Cannistraro, echoing several other intelligence veterans interviewed.” Additionally, CIA officials “charged that the hard-liners in the Defense Department and vice president's office had 'pressured' agency analysts to paint a dire picture of Saddam's capabilities and intentions.” [Sources: Dallas Morning News, 7/28/03; Newsweek, 7/28/03]
JANUARY, 2003 – STATE DEPT. INTEL BUREAU REITERATE WARNING TO POWELL: “The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the State Department's in-house analysis unit, and nuclear experts at the Department of Energy are understood to have explicitly warned Secretary of State Colin Powell during the preparation of his speech that the evidence was questionable. The Bureau reiterated to Mr. Powell during the preparation of his February speech that its analysts were not persuaded that the aluminum tubes the Administration was citing could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium.” [Source: Financial Times, 7/30/03]
FEBRUARY 14, 2003 – UN WARNS WHITE HOUSE THAT NO WMD HAVE BEEN FOUND: “In their third progress report since U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed in November, inspectors told the council they had not found any weapons of mass destruction.” Weapons inspector Hans Blix told the U.N. Security Council they had been unable to find any WMD in Iraq and that more time was needed for inspections. [Source: CNN, 2/14/03]
FEBRUARY 15, 2003 – IAEA WARNS WHITE HOUSE NO NUCLEAR EVIDENCE: The head of the IAEA told the U.N. in February that "We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq." The IAEA examined “2,000 pages of documents seized Jan. 16 from an Iraqi scientist's home -- evidence, the Americans said, that the Iraqi regime was hiding government documents in private homes. The documents, including some marked classified, appear to be the scientist's personal files.” However, “the documents, which contained information about the use of laser technology to enrich uranium, refer to activities and sites known to the IAEA and do not change the agency's conclusions about Iraq's laser enrichment program.” [Source: Wash. Post, 2/15/03]
FEBURARY 24, 2003 – CIA WARNS WHITE HOUSE ‘NO DIRECT EVIDENCE’ OF WMD: “A CIA report on proliferation released this week says the intelligence community has no direct evidence’ that Iraq has succeeded in reconstituting its biological, chemical, nuclear or long-range missile programs in the two years since U.N. weapons inspectors left and U.S. planes bombed Iraqi facilities. ‘We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its Weapons of Mass Destruction programs,’ said the agency in its semi-annual report on proliferation activities.” [NBC News, 2/24/03]
MARCH 7, 2003 – IAEA REITERATES TO WHITE HOUSE NO EVIDENCE OF NUKES: IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said nuclear experts have found "no indication" that Iraq has tried to import high-strength aluminum tubes or specialized ring magnets for centrifuge enrichment of uranium. For months, American officials had “cited Iraq's importation of these tubes as evidence that Mr. Hussein's scientists have been seeking to develop a nuclear capability.” ElBaradei also noted said “the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that documents which formed the basis for the [President Bush’s assertion] of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic." When questioned about this on Meet the Press, Vice President Dick Cheney simply said “Mr. ElBaradei is, frankly, wrong.” [Source: NY Times, 3/7/03: Meet the Press, 3/16/03]
MAY 30, 2003 – INTEL PROFESSIONALS ADMIT THEY WERE PRESSURED: “A growing number of U.S. national security professionals are accusing the Bush administration of slanting the facts and hijacking the $30 billion intelligence apparatus to justify its rush to war in Iraq. A key target is a four-person Pentagon team that reviewed material gathered by other intelligence outfits for any missed bits that might have tied Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to banned weapons or terrorist groups. This team, self-mockingly called the Cabal, ‘cherry-picked the intelligence stream ‘in a bid to portray Iraq as an imminent threat, said Patrick Lang, a official at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA was "exploited and abused and bypassed in the process of making the case for war in Iraq based on the presence of WMD," or weapons of mass destruction, he said. Greg Thielmann, an intelligence official in the State Department, said it appeared to him that intelligence had been shaped ‘from the top down.’” [Reuters, 5/30/03]
JUNE 6, 2003 INTELLIGENCE HISTORIAN SAYS INTEL WAS HYPED: “The CIA bowed to Bush administration pressure to hype the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs ahead of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, a leading national security historian concluded in a detailed study of the spy agency's public pronouncements.” [Reuters, 6/6/03]
Downing Street Memo July 23, 2002 Now we must compare this with the memo from Downing Street dated July 23, 2002 between Minister Blair and his war cabinet. Attendees of the meeting discussed the fact that President Bush had already made up his mind to attack Iraq. These are some excerpts from the proceedings of the minutes of the Downing Street Memo:
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
DAVID MANNING From: Matthew Rycroft Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Excerpt: C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
Excerpt: The Defense Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in U.S. minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
Excerpt: It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
Excerpt: The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defense, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorization. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult.
Except: The Defense Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the U.S. did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
This was also concluded by Walter Pinks of the Washington Post Seven months before the invasion of Iraq, the head of British foreign intelligence reported to Prime Minister Tony Blair that President Bush wanted to topple Saddam Hussein by military action and warned that in Washington intelligence was "being fixed around the policy," according to notes of a July 23, 2002, meeting with Blair at No. 10 Downing Street.
"Military action was now seen as inevitable," said the notes, summarizing a report by Richard Dear Love, then head of MI6, British intelligence, who had just returned from consultations in Washington along with other senior British officials. Dear Love went on, "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
Yet this was far from what Bush told the American people. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam Hussein through military action. But the record below shows Bush claimed over and over after July 23rd of 2002, after the determination had already been made, until the war began that he has not made up his mind in these public statements to the American people.
BUSH: “of course, I haven’t made up my mind we’re going to war with Iraq.” [10/01/02]
BUSH: “Hopefully, we can do this peacefully, don’t get me wrong. And if the world were to collectively come together to do so, and to put pressure on Saddam Hussein and convince him to disarm, there’s a chance he may decide to do just that. And war is not my first choice, don’t, it’s my last choice.”[11/07/02]
BUSH: “This is our attempt to work with the world community to create peace. And the best way for peace is for Mr. Saddam Hussein to disarm. It’s up to him to make his decision.” [12/04/02]
BUSH: “You said we’re headed to war in Iraq, I don’t know why you say that. I hope we’re not headed to war in Iraq. I’m the person who gets to decide, not you. I hope this can be done peacefully.” [12/31/02]
BUSH: “First of all, you know, I’m hopeful we won’t have to go to war. And let’s leave it at that.”[01/02/03]
BUSH: “But Saddam Hussein is, he’s treating the demands of the world as a joke up to now, and it was his choice to make. He’s the person who gets to decide war or peace.” [02/07/03]
BUSH: “I’ve not made up our mind about military action. Hopefully, this can be done peacefully.” [03/06/03]
BUSH: “I want to remind you that it’s his choice to make as to whether or not we go to war. It’s Saddam’s choice. He’s the person that can make that choice of was and peace.” [03/06/03]
BUSH: “We’re doing everything we can to avoid war in Iraq. But if Saddam Hussein does not disarm peacefully, he will be disarmed by force.” [03/08/03]
BUSH: “Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it.” [03/17/03]
March 19, 2003…Bush invades Iraq.
Anthony H. Cordesman, senior analyst at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies: "Regardless of whether we say so publicly, we will go to war, because Saddam sits at the center of a region with more than 60 percent of all the world's oil reserves." (This statement was made well before the war)
The End
The entire text of the Document: Rebuilding America's Defenses
http://www.newamericancentury.org/Rebuildi...casDefenses.pdf PNAC Statement of Principles: including signers
http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm Text of Downing Street Memo
http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html Washington Post Article on Downing Street Memo (recommended reading) British Intelligence Warned of Iraq War Blair Was Told of White House's Determination to Use Military against Hussein By Walter Pinks Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, May 13, 2005; Page A18
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...5051201857.html Letter to President Clinton March 26, 1998 From members of PNAC
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm The Project for the New American Century. William Rivers Pitt: 02/25/03
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1665.htm Other References: Project for the New America., Rebuilding America's Defenses, Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, IAEA, Meet the Press, The New Yorker, Atlantic Monthly, The New Republic, The Washington Post, The BBC, Reuters, Newsweek, Declassified NIE, UPI, Financial Times, Project for the New American Century, NBC NEWS, The Dallas Morning, New Carnegie Endowment for Peace, DIA, CNN, Downing Street Memo, Project For The Old American Century/ Project For the New American Century, API, The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, MSNBC